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This study examines the impacts of several factors, such as 
internal capital markets, technology transfer via FDI, and 
in-house R&D activities on the performance and growth of firms 
using data gathered from the top 200 companies in China 
during the period 1998-2003. A finance company, as an affiliate 
in the business group, is used as proxy for the internal capital 
market. The foreign joint venture firms and in-house research 
center are used as proxies for technology transfer and for the 
existence of in-house R&D activities, respectively. This paper 
finds that having foreign joint ventures is positively correlated 
with the firms’ growth but not with the financial and market 
performance of firms. In contrast, doing in-house R&D activities 
is positively correlated with the financial and market perfor- 
mances, as well as the growth of firms.
Keywords: Finance company, Internal capital market, Joint 
venture, Technology transfer, R&D activity
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I. Introduction
A great deal of research has been done in identifying the factors 
that determine the performance and growth of firms in emerging 
economies, as well as in developing economies. There is also a series 
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of articles which share the view that the business group makes up 
for the market failure in developing countries (Leff 1978; Goto 1982; 
Khanna and Palepu 1997). This line of research suggests that firms 
affiliated with a business group outperform standalone firms in 
certain conditions. In addition, it is well-known that technological 
progress is a critical factor for sustained economic growth and catch 
up (Barney 1991; Lee and Temesgen 2005; Choo, Lee, Ryu, and 
Yoon Forthcoming). Numerous studies are devoted to investigating 
the impact of technological progress on the performance and growth 
of firms. 
China is one of the most successful emerging economies in the 
world. It has been growing at a fast rate over the last two decades 
and it has become a major economic player in the world. In the 
course of the economic development of China, capital and technology 
have been the most critical factors for sustained growth of the 
economy. The government has a clear understanding of the problem, 
and thus, has encouraged the FDI since the economic reform which 
started in the late 1970s. Two stock markets were established in 
December 1990 and July 1991 in Shanghai and Shenzhen, 
respectively, and the government also has driven the reform of 4 
state-owned commercial banks in order to allocate capital more 
efficiently. The Chinese government also has promoted building joint 
ventures with foreign firms aimed at technology transfer from 
advanced countries and encouraged R&D investments for technical 
catch-up (de Bruijin and Jia 1993). 
Further research has been done to explore the determining factors 
of performance of firms in China. However, a number of issues 
regarding growth and performance of firms have remained 
unexplored primarily because of the difficulties in getting access to 
appropriate data regarding the organizational details of these firms. 
This study uses the existence of a finance company as an affiliate 
within a business group as proxy for the operation of the internal 
capital market in that business group. This study also employs 
having joint ventures with foreign companies and R&D centers 
within the business groups as proxies for technology transfer and 
R&D activities, respectively. This study then aims to explore the 
impact of these variables, such as access to internal capital markets, 
technology transfer, and R&D activities, on the performance and 
growth of firms in China. 
This paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we 
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briefly examine the nature of the finance company, the joint venture, 
and the R&D center in large-sized firms in China, and draw several 
hypotheses for empirical analysis. Section III provides a statistical 
profile of the top 200 firms that comprise our data set. The 
regression results and findings are provided in Section IV, and a 
conclusion is drawn in Section V. 
II. Key Performance Factors and Hypotheses 
A. Market Failures and Business Groups
a) The Literature
One theory that explains the existence of business groups is 
transaction cost economics with a focus on market failure. They 
contend that business groups emerge in order to make up for 
market failure in developing countries. This observation was first 
made by Leff (1978). He sees the business group as a microeconomic 
response to market failure and “an organizational structure for 
appropriating quasi rents which accrue from access to scarce and 
imperfectly marketed inputs” (Leff 1978). Under circumstances of 
market failure, guaranteeing access to capital by the business group 
is a critical condition for better performance and for sustaining the 
growth of a firm in less-developed countries. Goto (1982) also argues 
that the business group is “an institutional device designed to cope 
with market failure.” He sees that under certain circumstances, the 
business group provides more efficient transactions among affiliated 
firms than markets do. When it comes to transaction of capital, 
firms can obtain broader and more secure opportunities to invest in 
member firms in the group by joining the group. 
Khanna and Palepu (1997, 2000b) further developed this theory 
and proposed the concept of ‘institutional voids’ to explain the 
emergence and existence of the diversified business group in 
emerging markets. Since many of the institutions that support 
business activities are absent or not fully developed in emerging 
markets, the business group emerges to fill institutional voids. An 
intentionally developed enterprise in a large business group can 
function as an intermediary among individual entrepreneurs and 
imperfect markets. Business groups can smooth out income flows by 
using their broad scope and thereby provide their affiliates with 
access to internal finance. They point out that several kinds of 
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institutional voids include those of capital markets, product markets, 
and labor markets. They argue that, for example, almost all the 
institutional mechanisms that enable capital markets to function well 
in advanced economies are absent or ineffective in emerging markets. 
With little information and few safeguards, investors are likely to 
avoid putting money into new business. In this situation, business 
groups with large and well-established companies have superior 
positions in getting access to capital markets, so they can raise 
capital and supply funds for new enterprises more easily. Business 
groups also play the role of lending institution to existing member 
firms.
Similar problems take place in product markets. Buyers and 
sellers usually suffer from severe lack of information, not only 
because the communication infrastructure in emerging markets is 
underdeveloped but also because there are no mechanisms to 
confirm the claims made by sellers or consumers. As a result, firms 
in emerging markets confront much higher costs in building credible 
brands than their counterparts in advanced economies. In turn, 
established brands have strong power. A conglomerate with a 
reputation for quality products and services can use its group name 
to enter new businesses more easily. In the case of the labor market, 
most emerging economies suffer from scarcity of well-trained people. 
However, groups can create value by developing promising managers 
and can share efficient management throughout the businesses in 
the group.
There are many studies that argue that group affiliation enhances 
performance of firms in emerging countries with empirical evidence. 
Khanna and Rivkin (2001) examined the effects of group affiliation 
on profitability using data from 14 emerging markets in Asia, Latin 
America, and South Africa. They found that the mean of estimated 
group effects in three countries is positive and statistically 
significant, while that in one country is negative and statistically 
significant. These results show that in more countries, a group- 
affiliated firm outperforms an independent firm operating in the 
same industry and within the same time period. They also reported 
that group membership in 13 out of 14 countries is related to a 
statistically significant amount of variation in their profitability 
measures, which means that group effects collectively explain more 
of the variation than industry effects do in many countries. Keister 
(2000) shows that group affiliation enhances affiliated firms’ financial 
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performance and productivity, using Chinese business group data 
from the late 1980s. She also found out that they performed better 
when they were members of more centralized groups.  
The performance of group-affiliated businesses seems to be related 
to group size and group diversification (Khanna 2000). Using 182 
listed firms’ data in Korea, Chang and Choi (1988) found that 
business group affiliated firms outperform unaffiliated firms and that 
affiliates of the largest four Korean chaebol, the most diversified 
groups in their classification, perform better than smaller chaebol- 
affiliated and unaffiliated firms, after controlling some variables 
including firm size, annual growth, advertising, and intensity. 
Khanna and Palepu (2000a) analyze the data of 1309 public firms in 
India and report a curvilinear relationship between group diversi- 
fication and performance using ROA and Tobin’s q measure, which 
indicates that group affiliated firms only outperform unaffiliated firms 
beyond a certain threshold diversification level, but not under it. 
They also document similar results analyzing Chilean firms’ data 
(Khanna and Palepu 2000b). 
These studies, however, do not concentrate on capital market 
intermediation but on various intermediations including product 
markets and labor markets because this line of research takes into 
account that market imperfection in emerging economies is not a 
phenomenon confined to capital markets but applied to other 
markets as well (Khanna and Palepu 1997; Khanna 2000). Therefore, 
group affiliation itself or proxies for combined intermediation are 
used for their studies. However, some studies have been performed 
to examine the isolated effect of internal capital markets on firms’ 
performance in emerging markets. Chang and Hong (2000) examined 
the effects of product and capital market intermediation separately 
and suggested that the internal market of business groups play some 
role in supplementing imperfect external capital markets. Using late 
80’s panel data on China’s 40 largest business groups and their 
member firms, Keister (1998) showed that firms in business groups 
with a finance company experienced better performance than firms 
in groups without a finance company.
　
b) The Finance Companies in Chinese business groups
This study examines the effect of the internal capital market on 
firms’ performance using data on the largest public companies in 
China. Some business groups in China have a finance company as 
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one of their affiliates. In the process of economic development in 
China, underdeveloped Chinese financial markets provided no 
guarantee that funds would be efficiently supplied or distributed. 
Finance companies (caiwugongsi in Chinese) emerged to facilitate 
their affiliates’ access to capital markets as an alternative measure 
for underdeveloped capital markets in China. A finance company is a 
non-bank financial firm responsible for a business group’s finance 
activity.1 Group member firms (including the core firm) primarily 
create relationships with finance companies by doing equity 
investment over them. 
The finance companies have several roles. First, the finance 
companies in business groups are supposed to manage the idle or 
extra financial resources of the affiliated firms of the business 
groups. However, they are prohibited by law to accept deposits from 
individuals who work for member firms but are allowed to get loans 
from the government through one of the state’s four specialized 
banks. Based on these funds, they can make loans and provide 
other financial services to group member firms. By doing so, the 
finance companies make it possible for their member firms to meet 
production, research and development, and marketing needs that 
may not be satisfied without such access to capital.2 Finance 
companies affiliated to a group are not allowed to lend funds to 
individuals or firms that are not member firms.3 Furthermore, 
finance companies help member firms make proper investment 
decisions, regarding both intra-group investments and investment 
towards outside opportunities. They are expected to perform better 
based on their superior manpower in the areas of finance. Finally, 
the finance company plays a central role in coordinating the 
horizontal and vertical integration across firms and separation of 
some firms from the group (Keister 2000). In summary, the finance 
company has offered an alternative role to imperfect capital markets  
1
It is “an independent legal entity with an independent management 
system,” and “solely responsible for its economic decisions” (Keister 2000).
2
Member firms recognize that they deposit money in the finance company 
at higher interest than they do in commercial banks and lend money from it 
at lower interest rate than from commercial banks (Qingdao Heir Annual 
Report 2003). 
3
It was enacted as a part of bank reform after the 1993 inflation, reflecting 
the concern of the government, which considered the finance company to be 
a source of inflation by lending its reservoir to outside companies (Keister 
2000).
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TABLE 1
NUMBER OF THE TOP 200 FIRMS RELATED TO A FINANCE COMPANY
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
No. of sample firms related to 
a finance company
27 31 34 38 39 38
Source: Authors’
in China by creating and running the internal capital market in a 
business group.
This study collects information about finance companies from 
annual reports of the top 200 listed companies. To examine how the 
internal capital market affects the performance and growth of firms, 
a dummy for access to the finance company is employed. Out of the 
top 200 companies, 27 are confirmed to be affiliated with business 
groups that have a finance company as a subsidiary in 1998, and 
the number has increased to 38 in 2003.4
As discussed above, the finance companies seem to play a role as 
an internal capital market for firms affiliated to business groups; 
thus, the use of a finance company within a business group the firm 
belongs to as a proxy for access to internal capital markets. This 
paper intends to test the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Access to an internal capital market run by the 
business groups and its finance company is positively correlated 
with the performance and growth of a firm listed in stock market.
B. Technology Transfer via FDI and R&D Activity
a) The General Literature
Technological progress is a critical ingredient for sustained 
economic growth and catch-up. In emerging economies, access to 
process-related knowledge, such as technology and operational 
know-how as well as access to capital, is a critical condition for 
sustained growth of firms (Barney 1991; Guillen 2000). Technology 
transfer refers to the transfer, absorption, and adaptation of 
technology, including technology know-how and technology services 
4
There were 74 finance companies that were affiliated with a business 
group in 2004 (China Banking Regulatory Commission, Jingjicankaobao, 
2004. 5. 21).
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(Andresosso-O’callaghan and Qian 1999). The essence of technology 
transfer is a learning process that allows the latecomer to narrow the 
technology gap by shifting the emphasis towards innovation, and 
ultimately to catch up (Shin 1996). 
According to Mansfield (1975), there are three phases of 
technological transfer. The first phase refers to the so called ‘material 
transfer’ which involves the transfer of a new material or products to 
a country. The second phase corresponds to the transfer of designs 
and blueprints that facilitate the manufacturing process of the new 
product or material. The last phase refers to ‘capacity transfer’ and 
involves adapting a new item to the specific conditions of the 
recipient country. The last phase is much more difficult to achieve 
because of differences in markets, quality, tastes, and etc.
In relation to the first two phases, a direct form or pathway of 
spatial technology diffusion is represented by the acquisition of 
factories on a turn-key basis. The indirect form of technology transfer 
includes licensing, co-production, joint ventures with majority/ 
minority equity participation, and wholly or partly-owned subsidiaries 
established through the FDI.
b) The Chinese Case
The joint venture law was issued in 1979, and thereafter, China 
began to introduce laws and regulations to establish an institutional 
and legislative infrastructure in order to stimulate foreign invest- 
ment. The Chinese government encouraged foreign investors to build 
up joint ventures with Chinese firms aimed at obtaining foreign 
exchange, increasing industrial efficiency, realizing import substitu- 
tion, and creating new jobs.5 In general, foreign investors have 
several motivations for creating joint ventures such as access to the 
Chinese market, utilization of low labor costs, and favorable 
treatment from the Chinese government (exemption, obtaining 
finance, and so on). The aims of Chinese firms for building up joint 
ventures are to obtain advanced technology, to get access to foreign 
markets, to have instruments for advancement in the local market, 
and to develop research and development capacity (de Bruijin and 
5
 Due to WTO-related deregulations, foreign firms are no longer required to 
have Chinese venture partners to invest in most high-tech industries. As a 
result, more and more R&D facilities in China are wholly foreign owned 
(Lundin and Serger 2007).
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Jia, 1993). 
In the case of China, most of the technology has been transferred 
via the FDI, and more specifically with the help of joint ventures.6 
Technology transfer through joint ventures is very often associated 
with training of labor and management skills (Andresosso-O’callaghan 
and Qian 1999). In addition, a lot of recent studies report that 
foreign firms, including joint ventures, function as an important 
venue of technological transfer (Andreosso-Ocallaghan and Qian 
1999; Hu et al. 2003). After these, many researchers have devoted 
themselves to exploring how technology transfer contributes to 
economic growth or, more specifically, how it affects productivity 
and/or indigenous innovation activity. However, the results vary.
Lundin and Serger (2007) report the R&D activities of most foreign 
firms are still predominantly development-focused, rather than 
research-focused, to support local business and customers, although 
large multinational enterprises (MNEs) have begun to locate inno- 
vative R&D in China in recent years. In contrast, they report both 
state-owned and private firms, which have higher R&D intensity 
than the FDI firms based on the analysis of a dataset of Chinese 
manufacturing firms for the period 1998-2004. 
Motohasi (2006) reports similar findings. According to him, the 
R&D intensity of foreign-owned firms is relatively weaker than that of 
domestic firms, which stems from the fact that foreign-owned firms 
are operating by relying on technological capability at home. He 
confirms that the major motivation of foreign R&D in China is 
“market driven” instead of “technology driven” or “human resource 
driven” based on statistical analysis. 
Hu, Jefferson, and Qian (2003) examined the contributions of each 
of the three avenues of technological advance, such as domestic 
R&D, technology transfer, and foreign direct investment as well as 
their interactions to productivity within Chinese industry using 
6
Joint ventures represented more than 70% of China’s total production in 
1995 (Andresosso-O’Callaghan and Qian 1999). Shanghai Volkswagen 
Automobile Corporation, a 50-50 joint venture between Volkswagenwerk AG 
and the Shanghai Automobile Industry Corporation founded in 1984, has 
become the largest joint venture in terms of sales of all recorded JVs in any 
industrial sector since 1990. European motor manufacturers have secured a 
strong foothold in China. According to Andresosso-O’Callaghan and Qian 
(1999), broadening technology transfer provided the basis for the early 
success of European motor firms.
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firm-level data during a period of five years from 1995 to 1999. They 
measured foreign (domestic) technology transfer by a firm’s 
expenditure on disembodied technology purchased from a foreign 
(domestic) provider, such as patent licensing and payment for 
blueprints of technology. They reported two interesting findings. The 
first one is that the effects of both domestic and foreign market- 
mediated technology transfer on firm productivity are significant only 
when they are combined with in-house R&D. The second finding is 
that the market-mediated technology transfer does not have any 
impacts on the FDI firms except when foreign market-mediated 
technology transfer is combined with indigenous R&D.
This last study seems to suggest the importance of indigenous 
R&D effort by local Chinese firms or partners, and the need to pay 
more attention of in-house R&D activities by local Chinese firms.
Before economic reform, firms had no incentive to perform R&D in 
China because the technology acquired as a result of the R&D had 
strong characteristics of public goods. Under the planned economy, 
government required enterprises to have “cooperation spirits,” and 
thus, technology was commonly transferred free of charge. This free 
technology sharing existed for a long time even after the reform 
started (Kong 2003). 
In March 1985, the Chinese government issued the Decision on 
S&T (science and technology) System, which became the landmark of 
Chinese S&T system reform. This decision shaped the transformation 
of corporate R&D in several ways. First, the government required 
that technology be transferred with fees. Second, the Chinese 
government encouraged technology development institutes to be 
combined with firms in several ways and encouraged S&T institutes 
to develop into firms or enter into firms.7 Large firms were supposed 
to strengthen their technology exploitation departments or research 
organizations. Small firms under certain conditions could still have 
their own technology exploitation capabilities. Firms could allocate 
the technology exploitation fees into costs according to regulations 
and apply for technology exploitation loans from banks. Third, the 
government required that technology imports focus on production  
7 According to Kong (2003), many institutes entered into firms via other 
ways. In 1987, one third of 5568 research institutes entered into enterprises 
by entering into LMEs (large and medium sized enterprises) and business 
groups, forming small firms, participating and becoming industrial technology 
exploitation units, etc. 
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TABLE 2
RELATIVE R&D EXPENDITURE BY KEY ACTORS, %
1990 1995 2000 2005
Research Institutes 50 42 29 21
Universities 12 12 9 10
Enterprises 27 44 60 68
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (2001; 2004; 
2006), Lundin and Serger (2007)
technology and firms renovate existing equipment. Cities near the 
coast and SEZs (special economic zones) became the leading places 
to import advanced technologies, and domestic R&D activities were 
needed to combine with technology imports very closely. 
On the basis of 10 years’ experience, the Chinese government 
issued the “Decision on accelerating the S&T progress” and the 
“Decision on deepening S&T system reform” in 1995. The main tasks 
of the reforms were to enforce institutes to face the market economy 
and to promote the “corporatization” of technology exploitation 
institutes. The decision emphasized that transformed institutes 
should set up a modern corporation system, which clarified the legal 
status of transformed institutes. As a consequence of the reform, the 
revenue structure of institutes profoundly changed. Reflecting the 
promotion of science and research activities through market 
mechanisms, such as technology exploitation, technology transfer, 
technology consultancy, and technology services, the share of 
transverse revenue of institutes increased a great deal. 
The transformation of technology exploitation research institutes 
started in 1999. There were several paths for transformation. Some 
research institutes were merged into firms or business groups, some 
were transformed into S&T corporations and agencies, and others 
were merged into universities. 
Reflecting the reform of the S&T system, there has been a large 
increase in R&D conducted by enterprises in the business sector, 
with accounting for from less than 30% in 1990 to over two thirds of 
the total R&D in 2005. This is an impressive structural shift during 
the past two decades from an innovation system dominated by 
research institutes to an enterprise-centered innovation system. Jin, 
Lee, and Kim (Forthcoming 2008) also reported the increasing 
importance of innovation as the engines of growth in China using 
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　TABLE 3
NUMBER OF SAMPLE FIRMS WITH JOINT VENTURES AND R&D CENTERS
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
 No. of Firms with Joint Ventures 46 52 57 63 71 75
 No. of Firms with R&D Centers 31 41 61 68 72 68
Source: Authors’
the cross-province regressions.
Table 3 shows the number of sample firms with foreign joint 
ventures and the number of sample firms with in-house R&D 
centers. Based on a collection of information from annual reports, 
the study confirms that 46 out of the top 200 firms had joint 
ventures as subsidiaries or with 50-50 equity ownership with foreign 
companies in 1998, and the number increased to 75 in 2003. Also, 
we found that 31 firms out of the 200 sample firms have in-house 
R&D centers in 1998; the number has increased to 68 in 2003.
Given the availability of data, this study will examine the impacts 
of these two factors on firm performance in China: 1) technology 
transfer via foreign joint ventures; and 2) in-house R&D activities. 
We hypothesize as follows. 
Hypothesis 2: Firms with foreign joint ventures as affiliates are 
positively correlated with better performance and growth. 
Hypothesis 3: Doing in-house R&D activities is positively correlated 
with performance and growth of firms.
III. Data and Summary Statistics
   
This study analyzes the top 200 non-financial firms in China that 
have been listed in one of the two markets, Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Market, since 1998. The study selects the top 200 firms in 
terms of total sales in 1998 with their subsidiaries’ sales included 
because public companies that own more than 50% of another firm’s 
equity directly or indirectly are required to report both individual and 
consolidated financial statements by law in China. Furthermore, the 
panel data covers the period between 1998 and 2003. There are 
several reasons for choosing the method of data selection. First, the 
top 200 firms are selected because it is easy to get access on 
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detailed information for large firms and they have some 
characteristics that this study needs to examine. Second, this study 
chooses 1998 as the base year for the panel, taking data availability 
into consideration, and thus, only the firms which became public 
before or in 1998 in the two stock markets in China were selected. 
On the other hand, firms which did not maintain their public status 
until 2003 were excluded. Third, this study analyzes only non- 
financial firms, considering the fact that finance companies have 
different accounting principles. 
This study uses the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
Database (CSMAR) to obtain information such as accounting data 
and market prices, the industry in which a firm competes, and 
ownership structure.8 The China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research Database (CSMAR) was developed by the China Accounting 
and Finance Research Centre of The Hong Kong Polytechnic 
University (the Centre) and the Shenzhen GTA Information 
Technology Limited (GTA IT Co., Ltd.). Annual reports of companies 
listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, available in Shanghai Securities News (zhengquanbao in 
Chinese) and the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(zhenquanjianduguanliweiyuanhui in Chinese), are used for collecting 
information, such as the ownership structure, existence of a finance 
company, joint ventures, and R&D centers. 
Table 4 shows the distribution among industries of the top 200 
firms compared to the whole of sample firms. A two-digit standard 
industry classification (SIC) system based on the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission is used in this study. However, to avoid a 
small sample problem, this study uses a one-digit SIC system for the 
industries, except the manufacturing industry (Seo 2006). Thus, one 
of 22 industries (12 industries based on one digit SIC + 9 
manufacturing industries based on two-digit SIC) is assigned to each 
firm. The 200 sample firms analyzed in this study are distributed 
across 19 out of 22 industries. Industry dummies are assigned to 
every observation and a t-test is performed to test whether the 
sample of the top 200 firms has the same mean as that of the 
8
This study obtained equity ownership data of public firms by the top 10 
shareholders during the 1999-2002 period from CSMAR. However, the equity 
ownership data during the rest of the years (1998 and 2003), and information 
about controlling shareholders were gathered by reviewing the annual reports.
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TABLE 4
DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES OF SAMPLE FIRMS
Industry 
Code












A  18  2.19  2  1.00 16  2.58 -1.58
B   6  0.73  1  0.50  5  0.81 -0.31
C0  38  4.63 13  6.50 25  4.03  2.47
C1  33  4.02 10  5.00 23  3.70 1.3
C2   1  0.12  0  0.00  1  0.16 -0.16
C3  17  2.07  0  0.00 17  2.74  -2.74*
C4  93 11.33 18  9.00 75 12.08 -3.08
C5  27  3.29 11  5.50 16  2.58   2.92*
C6  74  9.01 22 11.00 52  8.37  2.63
C7 129 15.71 37 18.50 92 14.81  3.69
C8  38  4.63  9  4.50 29  4.67 -0.17
C9   7  0.85  1  0.50  6  0.97 -0.47
D  31  3.78  6  3.00 25  4.03 -1.03
E  13  1.58  6  3.00  7  1.13  1.87†
F  25  3.05  1  0.50 24  3.86  -3.36*
G  43  5.24  9  4.50 34  5.48 -0.98
H  85 10.35 39 19.50 46  7.41  12.09***
I   0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00   0
J  29  3.53  6  3.00 23  3.70 -0.7
K  28  3.41  3  1.50 25  4.03 -2.53†
L   9  1.10  6  3.00  9  1.45 -1.45
†
M  76  9.26  2  1.00 71 11.43 -8.93***
Total 821 100 200  100 621  100
Notes: 1) †, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at a 10 percent, 5 
percent, 1 percent, and a 0.1 percent level, respectively.
2) Industry Code
A: Farming, Forestry, Animal Husbandry, and Fishery
B: Mining C0: Food and Beverage Manufacturing
C1: Textile, Apparel, Fur, and Leather Industry
C2: Wood products and Furniture C3: Paper and Printing
C4: Petroleum, Chemical, Plastic & Rubber
C5: Electronics C6: Metal, Non-Metal
C7: Machinery, Equipment & Instrument
C8: Medicine and Biological Products C9: Other Manufacturing
D: Utilities E: Construction
F: Transportation and Warehousing G: Information Technology
H: Wholesale and Retail Trade I: Finance and Insurance
J: Real Estate K: Social Services
L: Communication and Cultural Industries 
M: Others
Source: China Securities Regulatory Commission
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TABLE 5
CHARACTERISTICS OF TOP 200 FIRMS 
Variable

























































Notes: 1) t-test and Wilcoxon z-test (Mann-Whitney) are performed to test 
the equality of the mean and median, respectively, between the 
panel sample and unselected firms. 
2) †, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at a 10 percent, 5 
percent, 1 percent, and 0.1 percent level, respectively.
unselected firms. The result shows that the 200 sample firms do not 
exhibit any differences from the rest of the firms in industry 
distribution in 14 industries but are statistically different in 
distribution in the following 8 industries: paper and printing,  
electronics, construction, transportation and warehousing, wholesale 
and retail trade, social services, communication and cultural 
industries, and others. 
Table 5 reports some important features of the panel sample 
compared with those of the other firms. The top 200 firms are 
younger than the rest at a 10 percent level. The mean/median of 
total assets and that of sales of the panel sample are significantly 
larger at a 0.1% level confirming that the panel sample comprises 
the top 200 firms. 
This study employs return on invested capital (ROIC), which is 
defined as the sum of net income before tax plus interest payment 
(EBIT) during the year divided by total assets at the beginning of the 
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year, as a dependent variable to measure firm-level economic 
performance. Most studies analyzing financial performance of public 
firms in China use ROA. This study, however, uses ROIC as a proxy 
for cash flow return because this measure of performance enables us 
to analyze firms’ performance without being biased by the different 
degrees of debt-equity ratios. Test results show that the mean/ 
median ROIC of the panel is not different from the mean/median of 
the rest of the firms. A proxy for the Tobin’s q, defined as the sum of 
the market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by book 
value of assets, is used for analyzing market performance. A more 
accurate measurement of the Tobin’s q is not allowed because the 
required data are unavailable. According to the test results, the 
mean/median value of the Tobin’s q of the top 200 firms is much 
smaller than that of the remaining firms. 
This study also uses two variables, the indicator of liquidity and 
the level of debt carried by the firm, to control for the availability of 
capital raised (Myers 1977; Myers and Majluf 1984; Chang 2003). 
The leverage ratio is calculated by long term loans divided by the 
book value of equity while the liquidity ratio is defined as liquid 
assets divided by current liabilities. A high debt-equity ratio will 
increase the likelihood of bankruptcy and financial distress and 
thereby limit the firm’s ability to finance its investment by borrowing 
(Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein 1994). It is expected that firms with 
more cash and debt-carrying capacity can finance their investment 
more easily; therefore, they experience higher performance (Chang 
2003). The median value of the leverage ratio of the panel sample is 
bigger than that of the rest (significant at a 5% level). The top 200 
firms have a lesser liquidity ratio compared to the unselected firms 
and the difference is statistically significant, which means the larger 
the firm the lesser the liquidity ratio. 
IV. Results and Findings
A. Financial Performance: Cash Flow Return
Because the dataset used in this study covers a five-year period, it 
is necessary to employ an appropriate method to analyze the panel 
data. If Xkit is defined as the k
th independent variable of firm i at 
time t, the model can be expressed as follows.
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Industry adjusted cash flow returnit (IACRit)＝β0＋β1X1it＋β2X2it＋ui＋εit
where, 
X1: control variables, 
X2: variables capture firm’s characteristics: explanatory variables
ui: the firm individual effect, taken to be constant over time t and 
specific to the individual firm i. 
εit: the reminder stochastic disturbance term, assumed inde- 
pendent of the Xit for all i and t. ε it~ iid (0, δε2).
Two basic frameworks are used to generalize the panel regression. 
The fixed effects approach takes ui to be a group specific constant 
term in the regression model while the random effects approach 
considers ui as a group specific random disturbance, similar to ε it 
except that it is constant through time (Greene 2002). Fixed effects 
always give consistent results; thus, it is reasonable to run fixed 
effects with panel data even when ui is assumed to be correlated 
with Xit, but they may not be the most efficient model to run. 
Random effects will yield a better P-value as they are a more efficient 
estimator, but they can be used under the very strict assumption 
that ui is not correlated with the firm’s behavior Xit. In other words, 
it is recommended that one run random effects if it is statistically 
justifiable to do so. The Hausman test checks a more efficient model 
against a less efficient but consistent model to make sure that the 
more efficient model also gives consistent results.
Industry-adjusted cash flow, which returns to assets, is used as 
the dependent variable to examine the effects of explanatory 
variables on financial performance of a firm. It is practical to use the 
industry-adjusted measure in controlling industry-related factors as 
well as annual noises. As mentioned before, this study uses return 
on invested capital (ROIC) as a cash flow return measure, which is 
defined as pretax income plus interest payments (EBIT) during the 
year divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. Industry 
adjusted cash flow returns to assets is calculated by subtracting the 
industry median of cash flow returns to assets at time t from raw 
cash flow returns to assets at time t. 
The natural log value of sales is used to control for firm size. This 
study adds the liquidity and leverage ratio of a firm, defined as 
liquidity assets divided by current liabilities at the beginning of year 
t and long term debt divided by equity at the beginning of the year t, 
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respectively, to control for the availability of capital raised. 
Dummy variables for the characteristics of control shareholder are 
included as control variables. Many studies report that firms 
controlled by the state are outperformed by legal person-controlled 
firms in China (Xu and Wang 1999). Equity ownership by the top 
shareholder is also used as control variable. Wang et al. (2004) 
report that the degree of ownership concentration is positively 
correlated with the operating performance using public company data 
for the period 1994 to 2000.
The finance company captures the internal financial market. In 
regression analyses, if a firm is affiliated with a business group 
which has a finance company, 1 is assigned; otherwise, 0 is 
assigned. The joint venture captures technology transfer from firms 
in advanced countries and R&D centers capture indigenous R&D 
activities. The dummy value 1 is assigned to a firm, which has 50% 
or a greater percentage of ownership directly or indirectly of one or 
several joint ventures with foreign companies; 0 is assigned 
otherwise. If a firm has R&D departments or R&D centers in it or as 
a subsidiary, the dummy value is set equal to one. The last variable, 
outside guarantees, is built to capture resource exchanges between 
firms. This study assigns 1 as a dummy value when a firm provides 
a guarantee to outside companies. There is a good possibility of 
causality between performance and explanatory variables, such as 
the finance company, joint ventures, and R&D centers. To eliminate 
the causality problem, this study uses lagged variables of them in 
regression analysis.
Table 6 reports regression results. The panel regression analyzes 
almost 1,000 observations with 200 groups. As mentioned above, 
this study controls for firm size by including the log value of total 
sales. Results show that the firm size measured by the log of total 
sales is positively correlated with cash flow. Two variables, such as 
the leverage and liquidity ratio control the availability of capital 
raised. The estimated coefficients of the leverage ratio are negative 
and statistically significant in all regressions at least at the 5 % 
level, indicating that the leverage ratio has negative effects on cash 
flow return. These results are similar to those of Korean firms 
(Chang and Hong 2000). The estimated coefficients of the liquidity 
ratio are not statistically significant.
The state controlled firms as well as the state-owned legal person 
controlled firms are significantly outperformed by the legal person   
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TABLE 6
REGRESSION RESULTS OF FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
Regression (1) Regression (2) Regression (3)























































































































No_obs 988 988 960 960 960 960
No_groups 200 200 200 200 200 200
F/Wald chi
2
5.59*** 68.66*** 3.39** 55.56*** 4.18*** 73.34***
R-squared 0.0776 0.1003 0.0661 0.09 0.0717 0.1071




Notes: 1) “State controlled” refers to the firms whose control shareholder is 
the state. “SLP controlled” stands for the firms controlled by the 
state legal person shareholder. “Top shareholder” indicates equity 
ownership by the top shareholder. Fnc_cmpnyl, Jnt_venturel, and 
R&D_cnterl denote lagged variables for the finance company, the 
joint venture, and the R&D center, respectively. 
2) Fixed effects regression and random effects generalized least 
square regression are performed and Hausman test results are 
reported. Numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
3) †, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 
percent, 1 percent, and 0.1 percent level, respectively.
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS248
controlled firms, which is in line with the results of previous studies. 
The signs of estimated coefficients of the dummy for financial 
companies are all negative but none of them are statistically 
significant, indicating that Hypothesis 1 is not supported. Thus, the 
market imperfection theory is not supported. The estimated coeffi- 
cients of the joint venture are all positive in 3 regressions but are 
not statistically significant. The results suggest that technology 
transfer through joint ventures is not very successful; thus, its 
existence does not have significant effects on the performance of 
firms in China. However, the R&D center has significant and positive 
effects on it when the variables capturing the ownership structure 
are controlled in regression 3; thus, the results support Hypothesis 3.
B. Stock Market Performance: Tobin’s Q
As mentioned before, this study constructs a proxy for the Tobin’s 
q, which is defined as (market value of equity + book value of debt) / 
book value of assets, to examine market performance. The industry 
adjusted Tobin’s q, calculated by subtracting the industry median of 
the Tobin’s q from the raw Tobin’s q of the firm, is used as the 
dependent variable in the regression analysis to control for 
industry-related factors as well as annual fluctuations. The control 
variables are firm size measured by the logarithm of sales and age of 
the firm expressed in the number of years. 
The regression is carried out on the 200 panel firms. Regression 
results in Table 7 show that firm size, measured by log value of total 
sales, is negatively correlated with market performance. Further, 
market performance is a positive function of firm age. In contrast to 
financial performance analysis, variables capturing ownership 
structure have no significant effect on a firm’s performance. 
Estimated coefficients of ownership concentration (captured by 
variable “Top shareholders”) have significant values in random effects 
in regression (1) and (3), but results of the Hausman test lead us to 
reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the 
efficient random effects estimator are consistent at the 5% level. 
The estimated coefficients of the finance company are positive, but 
none of them are statistically significant. The joint venture has 
positive coefficients, but statistically insignificant ones. The R&D 
center is positively correlated with market performance in regression 
(2)-(3), which support Hypothesis 3. Market performance is a  
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TABLE 7
REGRESSION RESULTS OF MARKET PERFORMANCE
Regression (1) Regression (2) Regression (3)











































































































No_obs 993 993 967 967 967 967 
No_groups 200 200 200 200 200 200 
F/Wald chi2 9.75*** 73.34*** 10.15*** 73.60*** 7.27*** 80.76***




Prob>chi2 0.0006 0.0000 0.0002
Notes: 1) Fnc_cmpny, Jnt_venture, and R&D_cnter denote the dummy 
variable for the finance company, the joint venture, and the R&D 
center, respectively. 
2) Numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
3) †, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, 1 percent, and 0.1 percent level, respectively.
negative function of the guarantee over outside firms.
C. Growth: Performance
There is a great deal of research on growth of firms in the 
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advanced economies. Gibrat (1931) argues that firm growth is 
independent of firm size. Mansfield (1962) reports that the firm size 
is negatively correlated with the firm growth and raises the 
possibility of departure from Gibrat’s law. Jovanovic (1982) argues 
that the firms uncover their true efficiencies over time through 
learning in his theory and suggests an inverse-relationship between 
the firm age and growth. 
In classical works on firm growth in advanced economies, Evans 
(1987a, 1987b) found that the firm age and size are important 
determinants of firm growth because firm growth decreases with firm 
age and size. He also found that the relationship between firm 
growth and firm size is highly nonlinear; thus, the growth-size 
relationship varies over the size distribution of firms. These papers 
deal with the classical question of the relationship between the size, 
age, and growth of the firm. 
For developing countries, Shanmugam and Bhaduri (2002) 
examined the effects of firm size and age on firm growth using the 
data of Indian firms, following tradition. Tybout (2000) performed an 
important survey on firms in developing countries, focusing on the 
impact of regulatory and protection regimes on technical efficiency 
and turnover. Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys (2002) examined firm 
growth related to certain other factors, such as access to capital 
market, resources, infrastructure and financial services. Lee and 
Temesgen (2005) explored the effects of various resources at different 
levels, such as physical capital, human capital, managerial capital, 
and R&D capital, on firm growth using data from 8 developing 
countries. 
According to Evans (1987a), firm growth is given the following 
function:
   
                St＋1＝[G (At, St)]
d (St) et                    (1)
where St denotes size at time t,
At denotes age at time t, 
d stands for time difference＝t’－t 
et is a log normally distributed error term with possibly a 
non-constant variance.
   
From Equation (1), we get the following regression framework.
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   (ln St’－ln St)/d＝ln G (At, St)＋ut                (2)
where St stands for size at time t,
    ut is normally distributed with mean zero and possibly a 
non-zero constant variance and is independent of size and 
age. 
Taking a second order logarithmic expansion of ln G (A, S) yields
ln G＝b0＋b1 ln S＋b2 ln A＋b3 (ln S)
2＋b4 (ln A)
2＋b5 (ln S)(ln A)＋u    (3)
Equation (2) can be modified as follows:
   
   (ln St’－ln St)/d＝ln G (At, St)＋BXt＋ut             (4)
where, BXt is the vector of firm specific characteristics that affect 
firm growth including dummies for the finance company, joint 
venture, and research center. 
From Equations (3) and (4), the following equation for the 





The dependent variable, (lnSt’－lnSt)/d, denotes average growth rate 
of sales of a firm for the period. The sample used in this study 
spans a period of five years, 1998 to 2003. Data used in this 
regression are analogous to those in the previous sections. Age is 
calculated by deducting the birth date of a firm expressed in year 
terms from the time when our analysis period started.
This study employs industry-adjusted measures to eliminate 
industry-related effects from the observed actual values. The industry 
medians of average growth rates for the period are calculated among 
the firms that operate in each industry. The industry adjusted value 
is calculated by deducting the industry median from the actual 
value.
Explanatory variables are defined as follows. If the median value of 
the lagged dummy value of the finance company during the 5-year 
period is one, one is assigned and zero, otherwise. Example, if a firm 
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TABLE 8
REGRESSION RESULTS OF FIRM GROWTH


































































































200 200 200 200 200 200
F-statistic  3.24**  2.82**  3.64***   3.28***   2.88**   2.92***
Prob＞F 0.0011 0.0027 0.0002 0.0006 0.0023 0.0007
R-squared 0.091 0.0947 0.1198 0.1108 0.0955 0.1413
Root MSE 0.15769 0.15778 0.15557 0.15637 0.1577 0.15489
Notes: 1) Fnc_cmpny5, Jnt_venture 5, R&D_cnter5, and Guarantee5 denote 
the median value of the lagged dummy value of the finance 
company during the 5-year period, the median value of the lagged 
dummy value of the joint venture during the same period, the 
median value of the lagged dummy value of the R&D center 
during the same period, and the median value of the dummy 
value of guarantees during the same period, respectively. 
2) White's heteroscedasticy-consistent t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. 
3) †, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, 1 percent, and 0.1 percent level, respectively. 
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has more than three ones as lagged dummy values for the finance 
company during the 5-year period, one is assigned to the firm. On 
the other hand, if it has less than two ones as lagged dummy  
values, zero is assigned. Dummy values for the joint venture and the 
R&D center are assigned in the same way.
Table 8 reports the regression results. Results show that age is 
positively correlated with a firm’s growth. This finding is different 
from that of Evans (1987a, 1987b). The difference may arise from the 
fact that our data only consist of large firms in China while Evans 
uses the dataset including small firms in the U.S. The estimated 
coefficients of the finance company are not significant; thus, the 
market imperfection theory (Hypothesis 1) is not supported. 
The joint venture has positive and significant estimators in 
regression (3) and (6) at the 5% and 10% level, respectively, 
supporting Hypothesis 2. These results are in contrast to those of 
the financial performance and market performance reported before. 
The coefficients of the R&D center are positive and significant in 
regression (4) and (6) at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. These 
results support Hypothesis 3. 
   
VI. Summary and Concluding Remarks
   
This study analyzes the impacts of several variables, such as 
access to internal capital markets, technology transfer via the FDI, 
and in-house R&D activities, on performance and growth of 
large-sized firms in China. The existence of a finance company as an 
affiliate in the business groups, having foreign joint ventures as 
affiliates, and establishment of in-house R&D center, are respectively 
used as proxies for the internal capital market, technology transfer, 
and R&D activities. Three performance variables are used, such as 
financial performance measured by the returns on invested capital 
(ROIC), stock market performance measured by the Tobin’s q, and 
firm growth measured by average growth rates of sales.
Main findings are as follows. First, access to internal capital 
markets has no impact on financial performance, market perfor- 
mance, or growth of firms. However, this result needs to be 
interpreted with caution given the imperfect nature of the proxy for 
internal capital markets. Second, technology transfer via FDI is 
found to have significant effects on a firm’s growth while it does not 
have any significant effects on financial and market performance. 
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Third, in-house R&D activities are found to have significant impacts 
on financial performance and market performance as well as on 
growth of firms. 
These results imply that in-house R&D activities have strongest 
impacts on performance and growth of large firms in China, 
compared to technology transfer via the FDI or access to internal 
capital markets. This result is consistent with the recent policy 
re-direction or initiatives by the Chinese government putting more 
emphasis on indigenous firms and their innovation capabilities, as 
compared to the past emphasis on FDI. Furthermore, foreign firms in 
China also started to increase and deepen their R&D activities in the 
country in order to consolidate securely their presence in the 
Chinese market (Gaulier et al. 2005). This study is limited only the 
on largest firms, which are analyzed here, and therefore, further 
studies with larger data on other types of firms are still needed. 
(Received 16 October 2007; Revised 24 February 2008)
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Comments and Discussion
Comments by Shiyong Zhao*9
 
This is a very standard economic research. First, the author 
derives five hypotheses based on three economic theories, namely, 
market imperfection theory, agency theory, and resource-based view. 
By the way, the author did a very good literature review on the three 
theories. Interestingly, hypotheses derived from these theories are 
conflicting. And then the author uses the panel data of the Chinese 
large-sized public firms to test (either to confirm or refute) the 
hypotheses. 
This paper identifies capital and technology as two most important 
factors affecting the growth and performance of firms. With regard to 
capital, we know capital sources of firms are various, but the author 
only considers the internal capital market  with finance company as 
the proxy. I think it is not enough that is probably why the 
regression results do not support the conflicting hypotheses of 1 and 
1’. 
The author gives an excellent description about the role of finance 
companies. There is no problem that the author uses finance 
company as the proxy for internal capital market of large firms. But 
the role of finance company substitutes part of the commercial 
banks, so it is very hard for business groups to get approval for 
establishing a finance company. So I guess there are two few firms 
that have finance companies. The other two constructions, joint 
venture and R&D investment as proxies for technology transfer and 
technology accumulation, make good sense and thus are convincing, 
in my opinion.
The paper finds that “joint ventures have significant effects on firm 
growth. It is partially because joint ventures are related to foreign 
markets as well as technology transfer.” This result is consistent 
*Associate Research Fellow, Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences, 2 Yuetan Beixiaojie, Xicheng District, Beijing 100836, 
People's Republic of China, (Tel) +8610-6803-4420, (E-mail) zhaoshiyong@ 
yahoo.com.cn
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with the reality, according to my knowledge, because Chinese 
exporting products are mainly produced by foreign-invested 
enterprises (FIEs), including joint ventures. Moreover, the paper also 
finds that “the research center or R&D investment has significant 
effects on not only performance but also growth of firms in China.” 
This implies that China has caught up with advanced technologies in 
many industries. Otherwise, the role of R&D should not be so 
significant. These are important findings. 
Another critic is that, according to the content of the paper, the 
focus is on the determinants that might affect the growth and 
performance of Chinese largest firms. So the title  performance and 
growth of the largest firms in China is a little bit too general and 
vague. 
Another limitation of the paper is that it is not very convincing 
just to use 200 public companies listed on the stock market to 
represent the population of Chinese largest firms. Moreover, most of 
the firms in the sample are state-owned enterprises (SOEs). So the 
findings of the research cannot be extended to all large firms in 
China, since private firms are playing a more and more important 
role in the Chinese economy. But private firms hesitate to list on the 
stock market because of the stringent requirements such as 
information disclosure, financial standardization, etc. 

